See what's
watching you.

The honest question. A database of surveillance assets is itself a surveillance asset. A hostile actor could read Sentinel as a map of where to plan operations around blind spots. We treat that question directly rather than wait for a reviewer to surface it.

Three structural answers. First, every record in Sentinel is already public. The underlying data lives on FLOCK (Ringmast4r), EFF Atlas of Surveillance, OpenStreetMap, DeFlock, and government open-data feeds. Symvek does not collect data. Symvek integrates what is already published, normalizes the schema, and makes it searchable. Removing Sentinel does not remove the data; it only removes the integrated search experience.

Second, the asymmetry that drives mass-surveillance harm runs in one direction. Citizens cannot audit the cameras pointed at them; agencies do not publish their installations; vendors do not publish their integration agreements. The information advantage already sits with the watchers. A search tool that lets a journalist, an oversight board, a defence lawyer, or a citizen verify what is observing them in their neighbourhood narrows that asymmetry. It does not widen it.

Third, the dual-use posture is explicit and not deniable. Symvek will not provide custom enrichment, real-time alerting on agency installations, or any service that would meaningfully advantage a hostile actor over a citizen, journalist, or oversight body. The product is the same map for everyone, sourced from public records, run client-side. We answer the dual-use question with the architecture, not with a policy.